The Tug-of-War in the Laboratory by Deck, Cary & Sheremeta, Roman
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Working Papers Economic Science Institute
1-5-2018
The Tug-of-War in the Laboratory
Cary Deck
Chapman University, deck@chapman.edu
Roman Sheremeta
Chapman University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers
Part of the Econometrics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in ESI Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deck, C., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2018). The tug-of-war in the laboratory. ESI Working Paper 18-21. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/275/
The Tug-of-War in the Laboratory
Comments
ESI Working Paper 18-21
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/275
 
The Tug-of-War in the Laboratory 
 
Cary Deck a,b 
Roman M. Sheremeta b,c,* 
 
a Department of Economics, University of Alabama 
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, USA 
b Economic Science Institute, Chapman University 
One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866 
c Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University 
11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH 44106, U.S.A. 
 
 
 
 
January 5, 2018 
 
Abstract 
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, 
operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some 
theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of 
the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under 
standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the 
follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to 
increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win the tug-
of-war causes a greater reduction in bidding than either a decrease in the prize or greater impatience 
despite all three having the same predicted effect. These findings have implications both for 
theorists and practitioners. 
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1. Introduction 
The term “tug-of-war” derives from a rope pulling contest in which two contestants (or 
groups) pull a rope in different directions until one of the contestants pulls the other across a middle 
ground. But more generally, tug-of-war describes a contest consisting of a series of battles, where 
a battle victory of one contestant moves the game closer to the winner’s preferred terminal state, 
and where one contestant wins the war if the difference in the number of battle victories exceeds 
some threshold (Konrad and Kovenock, 2005; Agastya and McAfee, 2006). As a modeling device, 
the tug-of-war has a large number of applications like R&D races in economics (Harris and 
Vickers, 1987) and the interaction of viruses and cells in biology (Zhou et al., 2004). In political 
science, the back and forth between the legislature and the president (Whitford, 2005) and the 
status of Jerusalem (Organski and Lust-Okar, 1997) have been described as tug-of-wars as has the 
tradeoff between efficient production and improving customer satisfaction with early delivery in 
operations management (Schutten et al., 1996).  
Harris and Vickers (1987) were the first to formally examine the tug-of-war game.1 They 
analyzed an R&D race as a tug-of-war in which two players engage in a series of multiple battles 
and the winner of each battle is determined probabilistically. The assumptions of their model, 
prevented Harris and Vickers from completely solving the model, and instead they were only able 
to obtain qualitative predictions. More recently, Konrad and Kovenock (2005) have explicitly 
solved the tug-of-war game and provided conditions for a unique equilibrium. They showed that 
the contest effort crucially depends on the number of needed victories, the value of the prize, and 
                                                 
1 The structure of the tug-of-war game is reminiscent of a dollar auction, and so one could cite the seminal paper by 
Shubik (1971) as a starting point for this literature. 
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the discount rate.  In a related paper, Agastya and McAfee (2006) also derive equilibrium 
conditions for an alternative formulation of the tug-of-war game.2 
Despite an established theoretical literature, no effort has been devoted to empirically 
investigate individual behavior in the tug-of-war and compare such behavior with theoretical 
predictions. This is understandable, because it is not trivial to measure individual effort with 
naturally-occurring data, as the researcher can only observe the performance of contestants, which 
is a function of effort, ability and luck (see the discussion in Ericsson and Charness, 1994). In 
addition to measurement error, self-selection and endogeneity are unavoidable in dynamic settings 
(see the discussion in Kimbrough et al., 2018). Given the difficulties of testing the tug-of-war with 
naturally-occurring data, we chose to conduct a controlled laboratory experiment, which allows us 
to examine behavior in the tug-of-war without confounding effects and endogeneity issues. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the tug-of-war 
experimentally (see Dechenaux et al., 2015 for a review of the experimental contest literature). 
Our experiment examines the theoretical predictions of Konrad and Kovenock (2005), using a 
three-by-one between-subjects design. In the Low Value treatment, the value of the prize v, is lower 
than in the other treatments. The Extended treatment involves more possible states m and thus a 
greater necessary margin for victory, than the other two treatments. The Impatient treatment, 
reduces the discount rate δ as compared to the other treatments. We follow the standard procedure 
for inducing a discount rate by making continuation to the next round probabilistic (see Dal Bo, 
2005; Duffy, 2008). The key aspect of the design is that for all three treatments δm/2v is fixed, 
which makes all three treatments theoretically equivalent. The prediction is that contestants should 
                                                 
2 Agastya and McAfee (2006) assume that if both players bid the same amount in a given state, then neither player 
wins, while Konrad and Kovenock (2005) assume that if bids are the same, then the “advantaged” player wins. Another 
notable difference is that, Agastya and McAfee (2006) assume the final loser in the tug-of-war receives a strictly 
negative prize, while Konrad and Kovenock (2005) assume a loser prize of zero. 
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exert costly efforts (bids) in the first battle (round) using a mixed strategy as in the standard all-
pay auction. In the follow-up rounds, when the state is not m/2, there should be no bidding. 
Moreover, bidding should not depend on the number of times a particular state has been reached. 
Finally, the aggregate behavior in each treatment should be the same as long as δm/2v is fixed. 
We find notable deviations of behavior from theoretical predictions. First, we find that in 
the first round of the tug-of-war, bids are not drawn from the uniform distribution and there is 
significant underbidding. Second, we find that the bids are systematically greater than the predicted 
value of zero in the follow-up rounds. Third, contrary to the theoretical prediction, conditional on 
the state bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, we find that bidding 
behavior is generally similar in the Low Value and Impatient treatments, but bidding is 
significantly lower in the Extended treatment, suggesting that extending the necessary margin of 
victory for the tug-of-war discourages subjects more from bidding initially than does lowering the 
prize or increased discounting. These findings have implications both for theorists and 
practitioners, which we discuss in the concluding section of our paper. 
 
2. Related Experimental Literature 
The most closely related experimental studies examine behavior in sequential multi-battle 
contests, also known as best-of-n races.3 Mago et al. (2013), for example, examine behavior in a 
best-of-three race between two contestants and find that the leader exerts more effort than the 
follower. Zizzo (2002) implements a best-of-n race and finds a positive correlation between 
investment and progress in the race. Ryvkin (2011) investigates a best-of-n contest in which 
players who choose the high effort early in the competition decrease their probability of winning 
                                                 
3 There are also some studies on multi-battle elimination contests (Parco et al., 2005; Amegashie et al., 2007; 
Sheremeta, 2010a, 2010b; Altmann et al., 2012; Höchtl et al., 2015). 
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in later battles, imitating fatigue. Consistent with the theory, subjects abstain from high effort in 
early battles in the presence of fatigue. Deck and Sheremeta (2012) examine behavior in a multi-
battle contest in which the defender must win each battle to secure the prize and the attacker needs 
only to win one battle to capture the prize. In the experiments, subjects’ behavior is consistent with 
the main qualitative prediction of the theory, except for one key pattern: when fighting, rather than 
lowering expected effort in each new battle, subjects increase effort. Finally, Gelder and Kovenock 
(2017) examine behavior in a multi-battle contest with a losing penalty, and also find escalation 
of conflict effort contrary to the theoretical predictions. 
Our study differs substantially from the previous experimental studies. Specifically, the 
tug-of-war differs from the best-of-n race because in the race the number of battles n is fixed and 
the winner is determined by the absolute number of battles each player has won.4 In contrast, in 
the tug-of-war victory is defined by the differential success of the players. The first player to win 
m/2 (where m is even) more contests than her rival is the winner. In our experiment, the tug-of-
war may continue for a very long time (infinity in the limit), potentially making it a very exhausting 
competition. 
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
3.1. The Tug-of-War Game 
The experiment closely aligns with the theoretical model of Konrad and Kovenock (2005).5 
There are two players: A and B. There are m+1 > 2 ordered possible states (where m is even) 
                                                 
4 Similarly to the best-of-n race, there is an active experimental literature examining behavior in simultaneous multi-
battle contests, also known as Colonel Blotto games (Avrahami and Kareev, 2009; Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-
Saguer, 2010; Kovenock et al., 2010; Arad, 2012; Arad and Rubinstein, 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2013; Holt et al., 
2016; Mago and Sheremeta, 2015, 2018). 
5 The model of Konrad and Kovenock (2005) is more general than what is presented here. We are only providing the 
detail needed for analyzing the specific situations we study in the laboratory. 
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located on the grid line {0, 1, 2, …, m} along which the war can take place. Let xt ∈{0, 1, 2, …, 
m} denote the state of the game at the start of round t ∈ [1, 2, 3, …]. The tug-of-war begins in 
round t = 1 in the initial state x1 = m/2, halfway between the two terminal states of 0 and m. At 
each round in which the game has not yet reached a terminal state, there is a contest resolved as 
an all-pay auction (Baye et al., 1996) where A’s bid is denoted by at > 0 and B’s bid is denoted by 
bt > 0. If at > (or <) bt then A (or B) wins the contest and the state becomes xt − 1 (or xt + 1). If at = 
bt then A wins if xt < m/2, B wins if xt > m/2, and the winner is determined randomly if xt = m/2. If 
the game reaches state 0 (or m) then the game ends and A (B) claims a prize of v. Otherwise the 
game continues to the next round with the state in round t+1 determined by xt and the outcome of 
the contest in round t. The two players are assumed to have a common discount rate of δ. Figure 1 
shows an example of the game with m = 4 in which A wins after the fourth round. In this example, 
A earns v-55 and B earns -40. 
The unique Markov perfect equilibrium is at = bt = 0 if xt ∈ {1, 2, …, m-1}\{m/2} and at, 
bt are drawn from the uniform distribution from 0 to 𝛿𝛿𝑚𝑚/2𝑣𝑣 if xt = m/2.6 Intuitively, when the 
players are even (at state m/2), they are in an all-pay auction and the expected payoff to each player 
is 0. If the game is at state m/2-1, then a winning bid by B will move the game to a point in which 
B expects to earn 0, so B’s optimal bid is 0 and given the tie breaking rule A should bid 0 as well.7 
Iterating this logic, B should never bid when the state is less than m/2 and similarly A should never 
bid if the state exceeds m/2. Because of the behavior that should occur when the state is not m/2, 
                                                 
6 For the details see Proposition 3 in Konrad and Kovenock (2005). 
7 Konrad and Kovenock (2005) use a tie-breaking rule that awards the victory to a stronger player (with a higher 
continuation value). This is common in games with discontinuous payoffs, such as all-pay auctions (Konrad and 
Kovenock, 2009; Kovenock and Roberson, 2012). The reason for using such a rule is to avoid having to use ε-
equilibrium concepts.    
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winning in the first round should result in winning the game in m/2 rounds making the prize for 
winning the first round δm/2v. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
The equilibrium solution provides the basis for the hypotheses to be tested in the laboratory. 
Specifically, we test the following hypotheses regarding the expected behavior in a tug-of-war. 
Hypothesis 1: When the game begins (at state m/2), a player’s bid is drawn from the 
uniform distribution over the interval [0, δm/2v]. 
Hypothesis 2: When the state is not m/2, subjects bid zero. 
The model also provides predictions regarding different tug-of-war games. In particular, if 
two tug-of-war games have the same value for δm/2v then behavior should be identical at state m/2. 
This leads to the following prediction.  
Hypothesis 3: Behavior does not differ between games with differing values of m, δ, and 
v if δm/2v is held constant. 
 
4. Experimental Design and Procedures 
To test the hypotheses we conduct a three-by-one between-subjects experimental design. 
The three treatments (Low Value, Impatient, and Extended) differ in terms of the values of v, δ, 
and m as shown in Table 1. In the Low Value treatment, the value of the prize, v, is lower than in 
the other treatments. The Extended treatment involves more possible states, m, than the other two 
treatments. The Impatient treatment, reduces the discount rate δ as compared to the other 
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treatments. We follow the standard procedure for inducing a discount rate by making continuation 
to the next round probabilistic (see Dal Bo, 2005; Duffy, 2008).8  
Our primary goal is not to identify how changes in a specific variable impact behavior, but 
rather to determine if strategic behavior is contingent upon δm/2v, as predicted by the theory. Hence, 
the key aspect of our design is that for all three treatments δm/2v is held constant (at ≈ 66). Although 
our design does not compare two treatments differing along a single dimension, one can identify 
the relative effects of specific parameters by comparing one treatment to the composition of the 
other two. The design of changing several treatment variables to keep the equilibrium prediction 
the same is commonly used in experimental economics to facilitate comparison between 
treatments and to test the most fundamental behavioral responses (Bull et al., 1987; Orrison et al., 
2004; Chowdhury et al., 2014). 
A total of 96 subjects participated in the experiment, which was conducted in the 
Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the University of Arkansas. Subjects for each one 
hour long session were recruited through the lab’s database of volunteers and no subject 
participated in more than one session. For each of the three treatments, four sessions were 
completed. Each session involved 8 subjects who read written instructions (available in Appendix) 
and completed a comprehension worksheet. After the worksheets were checked for correctness 
and any remaining questions were answered, subjects completed two unpaid practice tug-of-war 
games, and then ten salient tug-of-war games. 
                                                 
8 The duration was not randomly generated for each pair.  The randomization was done in advance so that the 
maximum number of rounds that could be played in a period was the same for every tug-of-war given δ.  For example, 
in every session of Impatient the first paid tug-of-war could last for up to three rounds.  Drawing the duration separately 
for each pair could result in subjects not completing their own tug-of-war but still having to wait a long time until 
another pair resolved its game due to the rematching of subjects between games.  The practice periods were not 
randomized to ensure that subjects experienced both a long game (5 rounds) and a short game (1 round).          
 9 
Each game, referred to as a period in the experiment, subjects were randomly and 
anonymously paired with someone else in the session.9 Figure 2 provides a screen shot for the 
Impatient treatment. Subjects always saw themselves as the player who wins the game at state 0 
on the far left of the screen as shown in Figure 2. The colored ball moved around based on the 
state of the game. The probability that the game would continue for one, two, five and ten more 
rounds if a terminal state was not reached is shown at the top left of the screen. The right hand 
portion of the screen records what has occurred in each round of the current period (game) and the 
outcome from previous periods.  
After all 10 periods were completed, one was randomly selected and subjects were paid 
their earnings based on the outcome of the game in that period.10 Experimental earnings were 
denoted in francs and converted into dollars at the rate 25 francs = $1. The average subject payment 
was $19.59.11 
 
5. Results 
The findings are presented as a series of results corresponding to the four hypotheses 
provided in the previous section. Figure 3 shows the distribution of bids in the first round of every 
tug-of-war by treatment. 
Theory predicts (see Hypothesis 1) that all bids should be uniformly distributed between 0 
and 66 (= δm/2v). Although, we find that by and large the bids are drawn from the same support as 
                                                 
9 The instructions used the term tug-of-war in an effort to help subjects understand the nature of the game being played. 
Copies of the instructions are available upon request. 
10 Other payoff procedures such as paying for every period could change the incentives of the subjects over the course 
of the experiment through wealth effects for example. 
11 Subjects were given a $20 endowment from which losses could be deducted.  
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the equilibrium distribution, none of these distributions appear to be uniform over the interval 0 to 
66. Instead, bids are skewed to the left.  
Statistically, we test that the mean and variance of each distribution is equal to the values 
that would be generated if subjects were behaving according to the theoretical predictions. Notice, 
that under the null hypotheses subjects are independently drawing their bids from the interval [0, 
66] at the start of every tug-of-war. For each treatment, either the observed mean, the observed 
variance, or both differ from the theoretical predictions as shown in Table 2. For example, the 
average bid is significantly lower than the theoretical prediction in the Impatient treatment (27.8 
versus 33, p-value < 0.001) and in the Extended treatment (16.8 versus 33, p-value < 0.001). Table 
2 also reports Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the observed distributions with the predicted 
uniform distributions.12 Overall, these findings provide evidence against Hypothesis 1 and are the 
basis for our Result 1. 
Result 1: Subjects do not bid according to the theoretical prediction in the first round of a 
tug-of-war. That is bids are not drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval [0, 66] and 
are skewed to the left. 
Another prediction of the theory is that when the state is not m/2, subjects should bid zero. 
However, we find that in the second round bids are systematically greater than the predicted value 
of zero. Only 3% of all bids at state 1 in the Low Value treatment are 0 and only 20% of the bids 
at state 3 are 0 in that treatment. For the Impatience treatment the respective percentages are 1% 
and 29% for states 1 and 3. The percentage of bids equal to zero for states 1, 2, 4, and 5 in the 
Extended treatment are 4%, 3%, 32%, and 41% respectively. Figure 4 shows the average bid by 
                                                 
12 The conclusions of each test are similar if attention is restricted to the last 5 periods, to control for possible learning.  
The one difference is that the variance in the Low Value treatment is no longer statistically different from the predicted 
value.   
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round and state for each treatment. Notice that when one player is in the state x the other player is 
in the state m-x. Also, because the continuation to the next round is probabilistic, some pairs do 
not reach the terminal state nor do they reach the next round. The data in Figure 4 are taken to be 
sufficient evidence against Hypothesis 2. 
Result 2: When the game is not in a symmetric state, subjects do not bid zero contrary to 
the theoretical prediction. 
Turning to the question of whether or not subjects behave the same in each treatment (see 
Hypothesis 3), we note that Figure 3 and Figure 4 suggest that bids are lower in the Extended 
treatment than the other two treatments. This conclusion is supported statistically in Table 3. The 
first column of Table 3 estimates how bids are impacted by treatments when the state is m/2. The 
omitted treatment is Low Value so the lack of significance for Impatient suggests these two 
treatments yield similar behavior on average. The negative and significant coefficient for Extended 
indicates that on average bids are lower in this treatment than in the Low Value treatment. Average 
bids are lower in the Extended treatment than in the Impatient treatment (p-value = 0.052). The 
second and third columns of Table 3 compare Impatient to Low Value at states 1 and 3, 
respectively, omitting Extended because 1) it has already been shown to differ and 2) the states are 
not directly comparable. For both specifications, the coefficient on Impatient is not significant.13 
Further, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests that the distributions of bids in round 1 are the same in the 
Extended treatment and either of the other two treatments yield p-values < 0.001. For the 
comparison between the Low Value and the Impatient treatments, the p-value = 0.099.14 Together, 
                                                 
13 If attention is restricted to the last half of the paid periods, the conclusions remain unchanged except that the 
significance of Extended in the first column is increased while the significance of Impatient disappears. That is, the 
evidence for Result 3 is even stronger when controlling for possible learning.   
14 If attention is restricted to the last 5 periods, the Extended treatment remains highly significantly different than either 
of the other two treatments (i.e. p-value < 0.001), but for the comparison of Low Value and Impatient the p-value = 
0.209. That is, the evidence for Result 3 is even stronger when controlling for possible learning.   
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the results indicate that behavior is similar in the Low Value and Impatient treatments, and different 
in the Extended treatment. This provides sufficient evidence against Hypothesis 3. 
Result 3: Bidding behavior is similar in the Low Value and Impatient treatments, but 
bidding behavior in the Extended treatment differs from the other two. In particular, subjects bid 
less in the middle state when there are more states in the tug-of-war. 
Figure 4 also reveals another stark pattern in the data. Regardless of treatment, conditional 
on the state, bids tend to increase the longer the tug-of-war has been going. For all 11 treatment-
state combinations, the average bid is lower in the earliest round in which the state was reached 
than in the latest round in which the state was reached. Table 4 provides statistical evidence of the 
period trends in each situation. For both the Low Value and Extended treatments, the trends (given 
by State i × Round coefficients) are positive and significant. The trends are not significant in the 
Impatient treatment; however, one should be cautious given the relatively small number of 
observations occurring after round 3 in this treatment. Thus, rather than following a Markovian 
strategy as predicted by the model, behavior exhibits path dependence. These patterns lead to 
Result 4. 
Result 4: Contrary to the theoretical prediction that bids are Markovian, bids are history 
dependent and generally increasing in the duration of the tug-of-war. 
 
6. Behavioral Explanations 
Taken together, our findings provide substantial evidence of behavioral deviations from 
theoretical predictions. While this result may not be surprising to those who have conducted 
laboratory experiments involving contests with different structures, documenting the relationship 
between standard theory and observed behavior is an important first step when examining a new 
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setting. As a second step, in this subsection we provide a discussion of the observed deviations 
and suggest two potential behavioral explanations in light of previous experimental results. The 
first explanation is that subjects perceive the actual tug-of-war in the laboratory as a game of 
incomplete information about players’ types. This is a reasonable assumption, given that subjects 
have a nonpecuniary utility of winning, which is unobservable and different across subjects 
(Sheremeta, 2013, 2015, 2016; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2015; Mago et al., 2016). The second 
explanation is that subjects may use a strategy of multi-dimensional reasoning (Arad and 
Rubinstein, 2012). Again, this is a reasonable assumption, given that subjects are boundedly 
rational and have been found to use dimension-reducing simplified strategies in complex situations 
(Harstad and Selten, 2013). 
We begin with Result 1. Contrary to the prediction that the first round of the tug-of-war 
should resemble a one stage all-pay auction, we find that bids are not drawn from the uniform 
distribution but are left-skewed.15 This result is consistent with the behavioral explanation that 
subjects perceive the laboratory tug-of-war as a game of incomplete information. Indeed, there 
should be no full dissipation in the single-stage all-pay auction of incomplete information (Barut 
et al., 2002; Noussair and Silver, 2006). Second, underbidding in the first round could be explained 
using a framework of a multi-dimensional reasoning. Specifically, underbidding in the first round 
can be a “proper response” to the observation that most of the competition occurs in later rounds, 
as opposed to the predicted “frontloaded” competition. Since successful participation in later 
rounds requires substantial bidding, it seems prudent to bid less in the first round. 
                                                 
15 Some all-pay auction experiments find overbidding (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; 
Lugovskyy et al., 2010; Llorente-Saguer et al., 2016), while others find underbidding (Potters et al., 1998; Gelder et 
al., 2015). 
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Results 2 documents that bids in the follow-up rounds are higher than the predicted bid of 
zero.16 Again, this type of non-equilibrium behavior could be explained by the fact that subjects 
have incomplete information about the opponent’s nonpecuniary utility of winning. Such a utility 
inherently transforms the game into a multi-battle contest with intermediate prizes; and one of the 
fundamental theoretical results with intermediate prizes is that “the player who is lagging behind 
may catch up, and does catch up with a considerable probability in the equilibrium” (Konrad and 
Kovenock, 2009, page 267). Alternatively, it could be the case that subjects first decide how much 
they are willing to spend on the tug-of-war and then they choose how to allocate this amount across 
the rounds (Mago and Sheremeta, 2015; Deck et al., 2017). This type of a multi-dimensional 
reasoning (Arad and Rubinstein, 2012) also could explain positive bids in asymmetric states.17 
Result 3 documents that bidding behavior in the Extended treatment is significantly 
different from the Low Value and Impatient treatments, despite all three treatments being 
theoretically equivalent. Following the line of two previously suggested behavioral explanations, 
one explanation for this result is that subjects play a tug-of-war of incomplete information. This 
entails that subjects should expect for the game to proceed more rounds than theoretically 
predicted, as they extract information about the opponent in each round. This also means that a 
tug-of-war with a large number of states (as in the Extended treatment) may be particularly 
discouraging for subjects since such a tug-of-war could potentially last for a very long time. 
Another explanation is that subjects use a strategy of multi-dimensional reasoning. To recall, in 
                                                 
16 A natural explanation of overbidding in asymmetric states is that the prediction of zero is at the boundary, and any 
mistake would lead to overbidding. The problem of boundary equilibrium predictions has been well recognized in 
dictator games (List, 2007), public good games (Laury and Holt, 2008), and contests (Kimbrough et al., 2014), and it 
has been proposed as an explanation for excessive giving, over-contribution to public goods, and excessive conflict. 
17 We are grateful to the Editor who suggested yet another explanation for the non-equilibrium behavior. Specifically, 
since subjects observe that other subjects depart from full-dissipation behavior in the middle state, then the optimal 
reply to this is to make non-zero bids at states other than the middle state. As a result, the full dissipation at the middle 
state is also not optimal. Therefore, the behavior of subjects can be explained as conditionally optimal or conditionally 
consistent behavior. 
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such a case, subjects first decide how much they are willing to spend on the tug-of-war and then 
they choose how to allocate this amount across the rounds. At the start of the tug-of-war, the best 
case scenario is winning the first m/2 rounds and claiming the prize – a path along the top left edge 
of flow charts in Figure 4. For all three treatments, the sum of the average bid along the best case 
scenario path is similar (68.6 in Low Value, 66.3 in Impatient, and 60.8 in Extended). Further, 
along each best case scenario path the average bids are fairly uniform. This suggests that subjects 
may begin by thinking about how much they want to spend along the path they hope to take and 
then bidding more or less equally along that path. As a result, bids at specific states along the best 
path in the Extended treatment are smaller than in the other treatments because the same total 
amount is being divided over more states. As subjects win and remain on the best case scenario 
path, they continue to implement their plan. Once they are knocked of the best scenario path, they 
adjust as evidenced by Result 4. 
Finally, Result 4 documents that bids increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. A natural 
explanation, based on incomplete information, is that the dynamic path is a function of the 
combination of the contestants’ types. Specifically, subjects who are more competitive (have a 
higher utility of winning) are more likely to reach later rounds. Also, as the game progresses, 
subjects should learn more about their opponents, turning the tug-of-war into a game of complete 
information, thus escalating the conflict. To examine this hypothesis, consider the Low Value 
treatment. When a player bids in round 3 it is on average 3.7 higher than the same player’s round 
1 bid. In round 5, the average increase from round 1 is 6.3. By rounds 7 and 9 the increases from 
round 1 are 21.5 and 34.3, respectively. Of course, this does not imply that the average change 
from round 7 to round 9 was 34.3-21.5 = 12.8, since not everyone who reached round 7 also 
reached round 9. Table 5 provides similar comparisons for the other two treatments as well as the 
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percentage of times a bidder in the center state at a particular round increased her bid relative to 
round 1. It is important to keep in mind that, while anyone returning to the center state in the Low 
Value or Impatient treatments must have returned to that state at every previous odd round, this is 
not true in the Extended treatment. For this reason, the Extended treatment is excluded from Figure 
5 which shows the average bid in each odd numbered round conditional on the final round in which 
the tug-of-war returned to the center state. In Figure 5 solid lines are used for data from the Low 
Value treatment while dashed lines indicate the Impatient treatment. For those pairs that reach the 
center state for the last time in round 3 or round 5 there is not much difference in their round 1 or 
round 3 behavior in either the Low Value or Impatient treatment. Those pairs who return to the 
center state for the last time in round 7 or round 9 do appear to bid more in round 5 than those who 
do not return to the center after round 5 in the Low Value treatment, but there are only 3 pairs that 
reach the center state for the last time in round 7 and three pairs that do so in round 9 and the 
average bid is increasing as the tug-of-war progresses for these players. Thus, Result 4 provides 
evidence of conflict escalation, i.e., conditional on the state, bids tend to increase in the duration 
of the tug-of-war. Although this finding is contrary to the theoretical prediction, it is consistent 
with a well-documented escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976). 
 
7. Conclusion 
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest used to model extended interactions in economics, 
operations management, political science, and other disciplines. It has attracted the attention of 
prominent theorists (Harris and Vickers, 1987; Konrad and Kovenock, 2005; Agastya and McAfee, 
2006), but there are no experimental tests of a tug-of-war (Dechenaux et al., 2015). 
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Our results show notable deviations of behavior from theory. In the first battle of the tug-
of-war, subjects bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, 
contrary to the theoretical prediction, bids tend to increase the longer the tug-of-war has been 
going. Finally, we find that the required margin of victory of the tug-of-war (how extensive the 
tug-of-war is) discourages subjects more from bidding in the first round than a theoretically 
equivalent reduction in the value of the prize or an increase in discounting.  
Although our findings provide substantial evidence of behavioral deviations from 
theoretical predictions, such deviations have two potential behavioral explanations. The first 
explanation is that subjects perceive the actual tug-of-war in the laboratory as a game of incomplete 
information about players’ types. The second explanation is that subjects employ a multi-
dimensional reasoning strategy. Both explanations are consistent with our main findings. 
Our results contribute to several strands of the existing literature. First, our findings 
contribute to the experimental literature on races (Zizzo, 2002; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012; Mago 
et al., 2013; Mago and Sheremeta, 2015, 2018). Specifically, similarly to the findings in race 
experiments, we find that subjects bid more in asymmetric battles than predicted. Therefore, 
together our findings suggests that the discouragement effect, which is predicted to reduce conflict 
intensity in both the tug-of-war (Konrad and Kovenock, 2005) and the race (Klumpp and Polborn, 
2006; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009), may not be as prevalent in laboratory settings. 
Second, our results complement the existing literature in operations research on strategic 
attack and defense of reliability systems. Most of this literature is theoretical (Levitin, 2003; 
Zhuang et al., 2010; Hausken and Bier, 2011; Rinott et al., 2012) and direct empirical validation 
of the existing models is difficult with naturally occurring data.18 The fact that in all treatments of 
                                                 
18 Researchers recently have begun to exploit experimental methods in evaluating these models (e.g., Deck and 
Sheremeta, 2012; Deck et al., 2015). 
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our experiment subjects shift their effort from the first battle to the later battles suggests that there 
are important factors which are not captured by the theory. This also suggest that in practice, 
conflicts resembling the tug-of-war may be more extensive, lasting for longer time, than predicted 
by the standard theory. At the same time, potentially long conflicts may deter competing sides 
from exerting costly resources in early rounds of conflict. 
Finally, our results could be of particular interest for economists studying patents and 
innovation. Beginning with the seminal papers by Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980), patent 
races have been often modeled as a contest between firms investing in R&D efforts with the aim 
of securing the ultimate prize, a patent. However, the literature is mostly theoretical (e.g., Harris 
and Vickers, 1987; Baye and Hoppe, 2003) and the predictions rely heavily on “unrealistic” 
assumptions making it difficult to establish its relevance to the real world patent races. For 
instance, our tug-of-war game is predicted to be behaviorally similar to a single-battle all-pay 
contest since winning the first battle (or ε-preemption) is all that is needed to win the entire contest. 
Our experimental results, on the other hand, show that the loss in the first battle does not deter the 
competitor from engaging in subsequent battles, and therefore mimic the real world patent races 
more closely. 
Of course, analogies between our laboratory environment and the naturally-occurring 
problems in economics, operations management, and political science are imperfect. While our 
framework captures some of the most salient features of the tug-of-war, we have set aside 
empirically relevant issues, such as contestant strength differences, heterogeneous prizes, and 
resource constraints. Given the observed deviations of behavior from theoretical predictions, 
exploring these extensions is an important avenue for future research, and we hope that our study 
will encourage other researchers to evaluate more complex dimensions of the tug-of-war.  
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Figure 1: An Example Tug-Of-War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sample Screen Shot in Impatient Treatment 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Bids in First Round by Treatment 
 
 
Panel A. Low Value Treatment 
average = 31.23, standard deviation = 21.47 
 
 
Panel B. Impatient Treatment 
average = 27.84, standard deviation = 19.97 
 
 
Panel C. Extended Treatment 
average = 16.81, standard deviation = 12.57  
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Figure 4: Average Bids by State and Round for Each Treatment  
 
 
Panel A. Low Value Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Impatient Treatment 
µ= 31.2
n= 320
µ= 37.4
n= 160
µ= 26.5
n= 160
µ= 33.9
n= 108
µ= 36.4
n= 43
µ= 32.8
n=43
µ= 40.1
n= 34
µ= 40.0
n= 17
µ= 41.1  
n= 17
µ= 63.2
n= 12
µ= 73.2
n= 6
µ= 69.5 
n= 6
µ=81.8
n= 6
µ= 104
n= 2
µ= 92.5
n= 2
State m=
0                 1                           2                    3                   4
Round t=
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
µ= 27.8
n= 320
µ= 38.5
n= 160
µ= 21.6
n= 160
µ= 37.6
n= 66
µ= 35.3
n= 19
µ= 44.4
n= 19
µ= 42.5
n= 10
µ= 60.0
n= 2
µ= 65.0
n= 2
State m=
0                 1                           2                    3                   4
Round t=
1
2
3
4
5
6
 26 
 
Panel C. Extended Treatment 
 
µ denotes the average and n denotes the number of observations. 
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Figure 5: Average Bid by Round in Center State  
Conditional on the Final Round in which Center State was Reached 
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments 
 
Treatment m δ v 
Low Value 4 0.81 100 
Impatient 4 0.73 125 
Extended 6 0.81 125 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Statistical Comparison of Observed and Predicted Behavior in the First Round 
 
 Treatment 
Test of Low Value Impatient Extended 
Mean (t) p-value = 0.147 p-value < 0.001 p-value < 0.001 
Variance (χ2)  p-value = 0.001 p-value = 0.190 p-value < 0.001 
Distribution (KS) p-value < 0.001 p-value < 0.001 p-value < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Treatments Conditional on State 
 
 State = m/2 State = 1 State = 3 
Constant 33.89*** 38.91*** 30.47*** 
Impatient -4.06* -0.47 -6.00 
Extended -13.00**   
Observations 1350 409 409 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level respectively based on a two sided test. Standard errors 
are clustered at the session level. 
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Table 4: Estimation of Trend in Bids over Rounds Given Treatment and State 
 
 Treatment 
 Low Value Impatient Extended 
State 1 34.44*** 42.91*** 19.10*** 
State 1 × Round 3.54*** 0.58 3.41*** 
State 2 31.86*** 29.24*** 23.24*** 
State 2 × Round 3.92*** 4.41 2.55*** 
State 3 20.17** 4.86 22.34*** 
State 3 × Round 5.52*** 11.26 1.94** 
State 4   19.55*** 
State 4 × Round   1.62*** 
State 5   6.44 
State 5 × Round   4.54*** 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level respectively based on a two sided test. Standard errors 
are clustered at the session level. The regression included a 
Period variable to control learning; the coefficient is -0.77 and 
is significant at the 5% level. Based on 3054 observations. 
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Table 5: Change in Bidding Behavior from Round 1 when Returning to Middle State 
 Treatment 
 Low Value Impatient Extended 
Round 3 3.7 (63%) 
8.4 
(64%) 
9.7 
(74%) 
Round 5 6.3 (68%) 
16.0 
(80%) 
12.3 
(69%) 
Round 7 21.5 (83%) 
 3.6 
(58%) 
Round 9 34.3 (100%) 
 15.3 
(83%) 
Round 11   7.3 (67%) 
Round 13   13.0 (100%) 
Table entries give the average difference between the amount 
bid in Round 1 and the amount bid in the specified Round for 
those subjects who were at the middle state in the specified 
round. The percentage of bids that increases relative to Round 
1 are given in parentheses. The number of observations for 
each cell is given along the central column of the appropriate 
panels in Figure 4.  
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Appendix (For Online Publication) – Instructions for the Low Value Treatment 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. Various research agencies have provided the 
funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them closely and make careful 
decisions, you can make an appreciable amount of money. 
 
The experiment consists of 10 decision periods. The currency used in the experiments is called Francs. At 
the end of the experiment your earnings in Francs from 1 randomly selected period will be converted to US 
Dollars at the rate 25 Francs = US $1. You are also being given a US $20 participation payment. Any gains 
you make will be added to this amount, while any losses will be deducted from it. You will be paid privately 
in cash at the end of the experiment. The period that will be used to determine your payoff will be randomly 
selected at the end of the experiment using a 10-sided die. 
 
It is very important that you do not communicate with others or look at their computer screens. If you have 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you. If 
you talk or make other noises during the experiment you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.  
 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
Each period you will be randomly and anonymously paired with one of the other participants, but no 
participant will be able to identify if or when he or she has been paired with a specific person. 
 
Every period you and the person that you are paired with for the period will have an opportunity to win a 
prize of 100 Francs. The person who wins the prize is determined by a game of tug-of-war that occurs over 
the course of multiple rounds, so at most of one of you will win the prize in a period. 
 
Each period lasts for a randomly determined number of rounds. The way the number of rounds is 
determined is as follows: after each round there is an 81% chance that another round will occur. This means 
that there is a 19% chance that a period will end after a given round. Notice that the chance of the period 
continuing does not depend on how many rounds the period has already lasted. At any point in time, the 
probability of a period lasting at least N more rounds is 0.81N. So the chance that a period will last for at 
least two more rounds is 0.812 = 65.61%. As you can see on the sample screen shot on the next page, by 
the heading "Rounds” your screen will show you the likelihood that the period will last at least 1, 2, 5, and 
10 more rounds. 
 
At the start of each period a green ball will be placed 2 spaces from you and 2 spaces from the participant 
with whom you have been randomly paired. Each round, you and the person you are paired with will make 
a bid. Any amount that you bid is instantly deducted from your payoff for the period. Bids cannot exceed 
the prize so bids can be anything from [0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 99.9, 100]. The ball will move 1 space closer to the 
person who bids the most that round. In the event of a tie, the ball will move towards the closer person. If 
the ball is equidistant from both of you then a tie will be broken randomly. This bidding process will 
continue until either 1) someone has moved the ball all the way to his side and thus claimed the prize of 
100 or 2) the period ends due to the random process described above. 
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To place a bid you simply type it in the box on the lower left portion of your screen and press Submit. After 
both participants have placed their bids, each person will be informed of the bids and the outcome for that 
round in the upper right portion of their screen. The green ball will also be moved accordingly. The number 
above the green ball tells you how many more rounds you must win to claim the prize this period. This 
number is referred to as the location. The lower right portion of the screen will keep a record of what 
happened each period. Recall that at the end of the experiment, you will be paid based upon what happened 
in one randomly selected period. 
 
Let’s look at a couple of examples: 
 
1) Suppose that in Round 1 you bid 13 and the person you are paired with bid 45. Since the other 
person bid more, the ball would move one position to the right, away from you. If in Round 2 you 
bid 30 and the other person bid 10, the ball would move back to the left to its original position. At 
this point, it is as if the period just began except that you would have already spent 43 = 13+30 and 
the other person would have already spent 55 = 45+10. 
 
2) Suppose that in Round 1 you bid 13 and the person you are paired with bid 45. Since the other 
person bid more, the ball would move one position to the right, away from you. If in Round 2 you 
both bid 18, the ball would move one more space to the right since there was a tie and the ball was 
closer to the other person. This would be the end of the period. The other person would claim the 
prize of 100 and earn a profit of 37 = 100–45–18. You would earn a profit of –31 = –13–18. 
 
3) Suppose that in Round 1 you bid 65 and the person you re paired with bid 30. Since you bid more, 
the ball would move one position to the left, towards you. If by random chance the period ended 
after that round, your profit would be –65 and the other persons’ profit would be –30. 
 
If you are finished reading these instructions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will bring you a 
review sheet to complete. The review sheet will not impact your payoff in any way; rather it is intended to 
ensure that you and everyone else understand the experiment. 
 
 33 
Review Sheet 
Please answer each of the following. If you have a question at any point, you should raise your hand 
and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
1) Complete the following table by determining where the green ball would start and end each 
round given the bids listed. 
 
Round Starting Location Your Bid Other Person’s Bid Ending Location 
1 2 15 26 3 
2 3 18 13  
3  20 5  
4  38 39  
5  3 2  
 
2) Using the table above, what would your profit be if the period was randomly ended after the 
third round? ___________ What would the other person’s profit be? ____________ 
 
3) Suppose instead that in round 1 you bid 10 and the other person bid 15. If both of you bid 0 in 
all subsequent rounds and the period was not randomly stopped before someone won the tug-
of-war, what would your profit be? ____ What would the other person’s profit be? _____ 
 
4) True of False, at the end of the experiment you will be paid the sum of your earnings each 
period. 
 
 
